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Abstract —This paper details the research into using audio 
signal processing methods to provide authentication and 
identification services for the purpose of enhancing cyber 
security in voice applications. Audio is a growing domain for 
cyber security technology. It is envisaged that over the next 
decade, the primary interface for issuing commands to 
consumer internet-enabled devices will be voice. Increasingly, 
devices such as desktop computers, smart speakers, cars, TV’s, 
phones an Internet of Things (IOT) devices all have built in voice 
assistants and voice activated features. This research outlines an 
approach to securely identify and authenticate users of audio 
and voice operated systems that utilises existing cryptography 
methods and audio steganography in a method comparable to a 
PKI for sound, whilst retaining the usability associated with 
audio and voice driven systems. 
Keywords— Authentication, Steganography, Two-factor 
Authentication, Cyber Security, Audio Security  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Audio is a growing domain for cyber security technology. 
It is envisaged that over the next decade, the primary interface 
for issuing commands to consumer internet-enabled devices 
will be voice. Increasingly, devices such as desktop 
computers, smart speakers, cars, TV’s, phones and Internet of 
Things (IOT) devices all have built in voice assistants and 
voice activated features. Already in the context of digital 
services, 50% of all adults have used voice for internet search 
and there are over a billion voice searches per month. [1] 
Powerful drivers such as accessibility, increased accuracy, 
device design (screen less and keyboard less devices), 
convenience and speed of communication will drive the trend 
for increased use of audio and voice as a channel to interact 
with information technology. [2] Additionally, verbal 
communication is much faster than the typical typing speed of 
the average person and recent advances in machine learning 
for voice recognition and biometrics have improved accuracy 
of this technology however, significant challenges remain to 
enable this technology in high security and high reliability 
environments. Despite the relatively inexpensive and non-
intrusive nature of voice and audio methods of authentication, 
they are still relatively low performance in noisy 
environments. [3] At the outset, the purpose of this research 
was to investigate the new methods of identification and 
authentication of users accessing IT systems based on audio 
processing in a model that can contain factors such as 
something you have, something you know, something you are, 
and contextual information such as user ID, device, location, 
background sounds, health information, emotional state, 
combined with cryptographic information.  
II. MOTIVATION AND RATIONALE 
With voice increasingly becoming the interface of choice 
for users of information systems, security techniques must 
evolve. Many of today’s authentication and identification 
solutions for voice channels (such as voice biometrics) have 
serious limitations in terms of security and usability. [4]  New 
forms of attack are emerging that allow malicious actors to 
gain covert access top voice-controlled systems and assistants 
which are inaudible or incomprehensible to the human owners 
of such systems. [5] 
 
Figure II-1 Increasing Application for Voice Control in Cars 
As can be seen in Figure II-1 Increasing Application for 
Voice Control in Cars voice control can be as trivial as asking 
for music to play to more safety related information such as 
“are my brake pads still ok?”  Research has drawn attention to 
serious limitations of voice only interactions with smart 
speakers and phones and the lack of command confirmation, 
voice authentication and any additional authentication factors. 
[6] [7]  In addition, recent research has also shown it is 
possible to use light to remotely inject inaudible and invisible 
malicious commands into voice control enabled devices such 
as smart speakers, tablets, and phones across large distances 
and even through glass windows and from adjacent buildings. 
[8] Imagine this scenario: A remote laser triggering your car 
to come off autopilot whilst driving on the motorway. Even 
with the addition of a vocal confirmation prompt, the attacker 
could easily anticipate and add this.  
 
Figure II-2 Setup for low-cost laser attack on Google Home 
(Sugawara et al. 2019) 
With cybercrime on the rise and increased regulatory 
requirements, there is demand for an uplift in the techniques 
and technologies available for users and consumers to interact 
with online services using voice and audio technology. Multi-
factor voice driven authentication systems in high security 
environments such as online banking often have favourable 
perception with regards to security but at the expense of 
usability. [9] [10] In addition, there is a significant proportion 
of the world’s population who struggle to use existing digital 
technology due to physical restrictions, cognitive abilities or 
social and financial limitations. This could include physical 
difficulty in handling and manipulating devices, visual 
impairment, physical pain, social exclusion or financial 
challenges.  According to the UK Office for National Statistics 
(ONS), nearly 10% of the workforce in UK lacks digital skills 
and at least 5% of the population have disabilities which limit 
their ability to use digital technologies.  [11]  At the same time, 
Amazon sold hundreds of millions of devices equipped with 
their voice assistant software Alexa, and Google Assistant is 
now available on more than 500 million devices. Online 
security concepts such as authentication and identification can 
prove a barrier to vulnerable persons, and this can result in 
their exclusion from certain digital services and a reduction in 
the amount of time they spend online. [12] 
What is therefore required is a model that can provide 
identification and authentication using audio techniques to 
compliment voice, that can eliminate usability challenges 
whilst improving overall security and accessibility of digital 
services. 
III. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS 
The research draws upon a number of key concepts which 
are briefly introduced: 
A. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of identifying or proving the 
identity of a user or process. When referring to the use of 
computer systems, authentication is the check that users are 
who they claim to be. Typically, authentication is categorised 
into one of three factors: something you have, something you 
know, something you are. A key part of ensuring that 
authentication is secure and consistent is to have a robust 
enrolment process that binds the user and the user identity. 
B. Biometric Authentication 
Biometric authentication can be said to be authentication 
by characteristic. Broadly speaking this is the concept of 
“something you are” and can be subdivided into things you do 
(behavioural) and things you are (physiological). Biometric 
techniques can be either static (like a fingerprint, iris) or 
dynamic (behavioural, voice, heart ECG) etc. Within the 
audio domain, the main method employed for biometric 
authentication presently is voice biometrics. The main two 
voice biometric techniques in use are speaker verification and 
speaker identification. [13] 
C. Speaker Verification 
Speaker-verification authenticates that a person is who she 
or he claims to be. It works by holding a database of reference 
voiceprints and comparing the speakers captured voice print, 
with one that had been captured during a previous enrolment 
procedure. Key challenges of this method include 
considerations of background noise, health impacts on the 
speaker’s voice, and the quality of the audio or telephony 
equipment involved in both the enrolment and authentication. 
Also, as the stored voiceprint and one captured at a later 
authentication will be different, the result of the authentication 
process is usually a matching score rather than a binary yes or 
no. [13] 
There are various types of speaker verification: 
Table III-1 Speaker Verification in Voice Systems (Markowitz 
2000) 
Verification Method User Action 
Text-dependant 
verification 
User is prompted to enter 
username and speak a password 
Text-dependent 
verification with speech 
recognition 
User is prompted to say a 
specific phrase, account 
number or PIN 
Text-prompted 
verification 
User enters a PIN or password 
then respond to prompts to 
repeat words or numbers  
Text-independent 
verification 
Users voice is verified covertly 
 
D. Speaker Identification 
Speaker identification refers to the identification of an 
unknown speaker. This technique does not require the user to 
respond to specific commands or prompts. 
E. Steganography 
The word steganography is made up of the Greek words 
steganos, which means “covered,” and graphia, which means 
“writing.” [14] Unlike cryptography, the objective of 
steganography is to hide the existence of the message. 
Steganography is therefore another term for covert 
communication. It works by hiding messages in 
inconspicuous objects that are then sent to the intended 
recipient. [15] The most important requirement of any 
steganographic system is that it should be impossible for an 
eavesdropper to distinguish between ordinary objects and 
objects that contain secret data. In the digital realm, image 
steganography is the most common and audio steganography 
is the second most popular type of digital steganography. [16]  
F. Audio Steganography 
Audio steganography is a method of hiding information 
within sounds or within the soundtrack to a video clip. Its 
applications vary from creating covert communications 
channels, subliminal manipulation, digital watermarking and 
digital rights management for the copyright protection of 
digital media. A key challenge is that the Human Auditory 
System (HAS) is more sensitive in comparison to the Human 
Visual System (HVS) so techniques used must preserve a high 
degree of fidelity over the original audio signal. The HAS 
operates over an exceptional range greater than one billion to 
one and a range of frequencies of over a thousand to one. [27]   
When using digital media, the secret information that is 
hidden within an audio file is not limited to audio information, 
rather any digital files or information can be hidden. This 
technique is the main technique used in the experimental 
phase of this research. 
G. Steganography Environments and Domains  
There are various techniques that can be applied to hiding 
data. The first thing to consider is the transmission media and 
environments the audio signal will have to travel through 
between the encoding stage (where the hidden data or signal 
is added) and the decoding stage (where the hidden 
information is then recovered and separated from the carrier). 
As described by Bender et al. [17] there are many different 
transmission environments to consider and four classes are 
shown in Figure III-1 Steganography Transmission 
Environments (Bender et al. 1996).  
 
 Figure III-1 Steganography Transmission Environments (Bender 
et al. 1996) 
Consideration of the transmission environments and the 
relative challenges, advantages and disadvantages. In the first 
example (i), the environment is digital end to end and thus a 
sound file is copied from machine to machine without any 
modification. This method has the least constraints on the 
hiding techniques that can be used in the digital domain but 
has limited application and the sampling is exactly the same 
for both encoder and decoder. In the second example (ii), the 
signal is resampled. A key consideration here is if the 
sampling rate is higher or lower when resampled. This 
environment will preserve the signals magnitude and phase for 
the most part, but changes the temporal characteristics of the 
signal. In the third example (iii) the signal is transmitted in an 
analogue fashion. Absolute signal magnitude, sample 
quantisation, and temporal sampling rate are not preserved 
however phase is preserved. In the final transmission method 
(iv), the signal is played in an analogue state over an air gap 
and recaptured with a microphone. This is the most 
challenging transmission method as the signal will be 
subjected to drift, echoes leading to non-linear modifications, 
phase changes, different frequency components and general 
interference. The transmission method has a significant 
impact on the type and amount of data that can be hidden in 
an audio signal using steganographic techniques. 
H. Voice and Audio System Attack Techniques 
Voice and audio systems of authentication and 
identification can be attacked like any other cyber system. As 
attack techniques evolve, new counter-measures will be 
needed.  Classes of attack include replay attacks, voice 
synthesis as well as attacks in the implementation of speech 
and audio interfaces like any other IT system or application. 
At a high level these can be classified thus: 
Table III-2 Classes of Audio Attack 
Attack Vector Technique 
Replay Attacker injects covertly recorded voice sample 
Voice Synthesis Speech synthesis and/or text-to speech adapted to 
the characteristics of the target or brute force attack 
Impersonation & 
Deep Fake 
Attacker mimics the target for 
verification/authentication 
 
IV. DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
In assessing the security of voice and sound driven user 
journeys, the authentication process either relies on voice 
recognition, a binding of the device (authenticating the device 
rather than the user), or the verification of text as previously 
discussed. Given the issues described in the motivation and 
rationale section, the model development has centred on 
offering an additional authentication factor combined with 
minimal user friction. The model development is still 
underway but the security provided by the model developed 
thus far is the application of both existing public key 
cryptography techniques and new steganography and 
authentication paths. The novelty in this model using audio 
and an out of band path to complete the overall authentication. 
Work has commenced on understanding the threats using both 
the STRIDE model and will be developed further using 
intelligence graphs in policy form to ensure all threats are 
understood and quantified. [18] When looking at the objective 
of secure and trusted communication across an untrusted 
media, it is first helpful to consider the conceptual model of a 
public key cryptography system. 
SOURCE
SOURCE
SOURCE
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Figure III-2 Development of the Security Model 
 
 
 
Figure IV-1 Public Key Cryptography Model 
In this scenario the sender can send a secret message to a 
recipient without the need to exchange a secret key.  Building 
on these concepts a number of scenarios are considered for 
applications where an audio interface is in use.  
A. Audio Public Key Infrastructure – Use Case Scenario 
The first scenario to consider is a proposal that audio 
sound can be used as a public key in authentication and 
encryption schemes. This would be desirable as a way of 
securing communications for applications involving audio 
interfaces and where low friction is required. 
 
 
Figure IV-2 Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model Enrolment 
Process 
 
Firstly, to build an equivalent of a public key 
infrastructure, a number of processes and components are 
required. The end user needs to create a key pair and encode 
the public key into a sound using steganography. There then 
needs to be a way of enrolling into the scheme such that a 
recipient can lodge their audio public key with the equivalent 
of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provider or Certificate 
Authority (CA). An enrolment process is shown in Figure 
IV-2 Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model Enrolment Process. 
In this process, the public keys are hidden not to provide 
security, rather for the purpose of not interfering with the 
audio quality of the sound used to convey them. This is much 
the same process as a website offering its public key in a 
certificate in a browser, not as a set of ASCII values visible to 
the user but as a simple padlock. This obfuscation is about 
audio usability and the security in the model comes from the 
underlying cryptography and the out of band confirmation 
described in the model below. This approach offers a new 
avenue of audio user experience where the sounds used could 
be derived from secure sounding clips such as a safe closing, 
a padlock snapping shut or tech sound. Alternatively the sound 
used for a public key could actually be branded by the user or 
company offering the service adding a marketing or 
personalisation opportunity in a way that certificates or 
passwords cannot. 
Once an infrastructure or cloud service provider has a 
directory of previously enrolled “Audio Public Keys” the 
question of how they could be used arises. If the objective is 
to minimise user authentication friction whilst maintaining or 
even enhancing security, a number of factors can be 
considered such as location of the user, verification of a user’s 
enrolled device, authentication of the user and mitigating the 
impact of threats such as tampering, spoofing, interception, 
interjection and replay attacks. In Figure IV-2 Novel Audio 
PKI Conceptual Model Enrolment Process, a model is 
proposed that could be used to provide mutual trust between 
the provider or a voice assistant “skill” or service and the end 
user. The concept works as follows. The user initiates a voice 
command which is received by the voice assistant device. 
Once the originator of the request and its validity has been 
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Figure IV-3 Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model – Command Verification Process 
confirmed, the voice assistant responds with two things. The 
command response and the users pre-enrolled audio public 
key. The audio key can be decoded by the steganography 
decoding and checked against the locally stored private key. 
In addition, the voice assistant service provider generates a 
unique session token which is sent to the users out of band 
device (this could be either a phone or IOT device). Using the 
private key in the local key storage, the users device then 
generates a session key with the token, the location, device ID 
and user ID. Once the session key is received (out of band – 
digitally) the voice assistant service provider can execute the 
command and any onward actions.  
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
The experiment was to conduct a lab test and initial 
analysis to evaluate a steganographic method which will be 
used to hide key material in sounds. The steganographic 
method under test was devised as part of earlier related 
research conducted into “Two-factor authentication for voice 
assistance in digital banking using public cloud services.” [12]  
Early iterations of this work involved utilising a sound in the 
form of a ringtone as an additional authentication factor. 
Whilst that research for that project pivoted away to another 
direction by utilising an IoT “beacon” device, the challenge of 
utilising sound in this way remained unanswered. Java code 
was written to investigate the feasibility of audio 
steganography for this purpose. [19] This was further 
developed and was used as a basis to develop a testable lab 
with adjustable parameters. The purpose of the experiment 
was to investigate the ability to encode a secret message 
within a sound, transmit that message to another receiving 
machine and then decode or recover the message from the 
transmitted message. The experiment had two key stages, 
transmission of the sound via digital means and transmission 
via acoustic “over the air” means. During the development of 
the code under test, it was noted that environmental factors for 
testing audio steganography over the air were very susceptible 
to environmental factors. Consideration was given to facilities 
such as anechoic chambers and soundproof environments. 
Further investigation led to the decision for the first controlled 
over the air tests to be carried out in a recording studio which 
provides a practical yet controlled and neutral sound 
characteristic for the testing.  
The experiment was also arranged to simulate potential 
use case scenarios envisaged for later stages of the research. 
The process from an operational perspective can be described 
as a series of steps as shown in the following charts: 
 
 
Figure V-1 Encoding Process 
 
 
Figure V-2 Decoding Process 
The depth of the encoding was the controlled variable used 
to assess the effectiveness of the encoding and decoding for 
this experiment. It was anticipated that the depth of encoding 
would impact reliability, detectability and quality of the 
sound. By adjusting the depth of encoding this balance was 
explored. In addition, the method was anticipated to present 
serious challenges for the recovery of encoded information 
when transmitted over the air due to factors such as 
background noise, audio processing, alignment of signals etc. 
The equipment was first set up as shown in Figure V-3 
Overview of Digital Environment for Audio Steganography 
Experiment. The experimental code was run on each audio lab 
PC and the files were shared via a network storage drive (but 
could have been any digital transmission method that 
preserves file integrity).    
 
 
Figure V-3 Overview of Digital Environment for Audio 
Steganography Experiment 
For the over the air testing, the setup was amended to 
incorporate the new method of sound transmission: 
 
 
Figure V-4 Overview of "Over the Air" Environment for Audio 
Steganography Experiment 
 
The equipment selected for this phase of the experiment was 
specifically selected to ensure the lowest possible noise, 
distortion or interference with the signals and sounds. 
VI.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Two sounds were used in the digital environment test and the 
over the air test. A music clip and a voice sample. The 
waveforms are shown in this section for later comparison 
purposes with the output waveforms which have both the 
original sound and the hidden encoded text. The testing was 
carried out by encoding sounds with a series of sensitivity 
settings using both voice and music samples. As expected, the 
decoding of the over the air lab test still requires further 
analysis. Waveform plots were exported from the Sonic 
Visualiser software. Each sound file was loaded in turn 
exported to a picture file with the same name as the 
corresponding source sound file. Once the sound files were 
loaded, the view was expanded such that the x axis time 
started at zero seconds and the amplitude of the wave fully 
visible in the picture. The first series of tests were run using 
the music sample input file, the digital transmission method, 
and set of sensitivity variable settings from 100 through to 
500,000. The first test was then run by encoding the hidden 
file into music file, digitally transmitting it to another 
machine and decoding it. It was possible to recover the 
hidden text with no error or degradation with message “this 
is a hidden message” perfectly intact with no additional 
characters. Playing the output sound file however, it was 
possible to hear a noticeable click at the start of the sample 
playback which could alert a listener to the presence of 
hidden data, interference or be considered an error. As can be 
seen by plotting the output sound file, there is clearly visible 
deviations from the input sound in the sub 0.2 second range 
again potentially alerting to the presence of hidden 
information. 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI-1 Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – 
Sensitivity Variable 100 
The next test was run as before but with an adjustment of the 
sensitivity variable to 1000.  
As before it was possible to recover the hidden text with no 
error or degradation with message “this is a hidden 
message” perfectly intact with no additional characters. This 
time however there was no discernible interference or 
difference between the input music sample and the output 
sound file from an auditory perspective. In addition, when 
plotting the output sound file it was not possible to easily 
detect the presence of the hidden information or interference.  
 
 
 
Figure VI-2 Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – 
Sensitivity Variable 1000 
The next four tests were with the sensitivity variable set at 
50,000, 75,000, 100,000 and 500,000. Although there was no 
auditory degradation of the sound and no visible artefacts 
when plotting the sound, none of the hidden text was 
recoverable as shown below. 
 
 
Figure VI-3 Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – 
Sensitivity Variable 50k - 500k 
A number of attempts were made to recover the hidden text. 
By increasing the value of the sensitivity variable, it did not 
allow for any text recovery above the 10,000 mark however 
the text recovered each time was different. Due to the way the 
encoding works, the higher the sensitivity variable, the 
smaller the difference between the reference input sound and 
the encoded sound so it is expected behaviour that there is a 
point where this difference is undetectable, and the method of 
encoding becomes unfeasible. The tests were repeated with a 
voice sample. 
 
The results of decoding the hidden message in the digital 
domain tests are shown below. The tables show for each 
sensitivity variable setting, the outcome of the decoding 
process, the decoded output itself, and a subject assessment 
of whether the encoding process impacted the audio signal or 
was clearly visible in the simple time x amplitude plots. For 
both the voice and the music sample, the decoding of the 
hidden text ceased at sensitivities above 10,000.  
 
Table VI-1 Music Sample Tests Results Table 
 
 
The same procedure was repeated using a voice sample and 
the results gathered below: 
Recovered text: this is a hidden message
Visible and audible interference
Recovered text: this is a hidden message
No visible interference
Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – Sensitivity Variable 50,000 Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – Sensitivity Variable 75,000
Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – Sensitivity Variable 100,000 Digital Environment Encoded Music Sample – Sensitivity Variable 500,000
Recovered text:  thhqhq_hhbbeq"nhttbhh
Recovered text: thhrhr`hhcceo nfttbhf Recovered text: rggr-gr-`-ggbbep nguubig
Recovered text:  k\\k\k\\\\\\z.zkzzkkk
Music Sample Tests
Sensitivity 
Variable 
Decoded 
OK?
Decoded Output Visual 
Interference?
Audio
Interference?
100 Y this is a hidden message H Y
1000 Y this is a hidden message L N
5000 Y this is a hidden message L N
10000 Y this is a hidden message L N
50000 N thhrhr`hhcceo nfttbhf L N
75000 N rggr-gr-`-ggbbep nguubig L N
100000 N thhqhq_hhbbeq"nhttbhh L N
500000 N k\\k\k\\\\\\z.zkzzkkk L N
 
Table VI-2 Voice Sample Tests Results Table 
 
 
It was easier to audibly detect interference in the voice 
sample. As this manifests itself as a short click, it was hard to 
hear any interference in the music samples. It was noted that 
the samples that failed to decode (at sensitives above 10,000) 
had a high incidence of similar characters.   At sensitivities 
of 5000 and 10,000 the messages were recovered reliably 
whilst not exhibiting any outward signs of interference or 
hidden information. These can be considered the optimum 
settings. It was shown that for digital transmission, an 
aggressive setting leads to interference whilst a subtle setting 
leads to decode failure and therefore a working range was 
established. Overall these results reveal a robust and usable 
technique if tuned correctly. 
 
A. Embedding Key Material for User Experience 
To prove this technique would apply to the overall model 
developed, further testing was carried out embedding an RSA 
public key. A stated before, the purpose of the steganography 
is to embed the key in a pleasant sound, rather than a sound 
analogous to a modem chatter which would be unpleasant on 
the ear. The security overall is provided by the model and the 
application of existing public key cryptography techniques. 
The novelty in this model using audio and an out of band path 
to complete the overall authentication.     
A 2048 bit key pair was generated for the purpose of the test. 
To confirm the optimum working range of the test was 
repeated between 100 and 100,000 in 100 increments. The 
result was then checked, character by character and the 
percentage of key match to the original recorded. As the 
scheme in its basic form needs 100% accuracy, the working 
range can clearly be seen in the plot below: 
 
 
Figure VI-4 Percentage of Recovered Key Material in Audio 
Sample Test 
 
B. Over the Air Environment Tests 
The files that were used for the digital environment test that 
had the hidden information encoded in them, were each 
played in turn through the monitor speaker and a second 
separate laptop with microphone connected via the analogue 
to digital convertor was used to record the sounds.  
The environment was also controlled from an acoustic 
viewpoint to minimise interference and distortion. The first 
tests used the music samples; the second set of tests used the 
voice samples. 
The over the air testing showed when the sensitivity variable 
was set at the more aggressive settings, it could be visibly and 
audibly detected in the experimental data. Attempts to 
manually align the original sound and the captured sound 
manually failed to result in any signals being successfully 
decoded. This is as expected and during the structured 
research the scale of the challenge of both aligning the signals 
for decoding and then compensating for the different 
amplitudes has to be addressed with some additional 
processing.  
During the experiment, the input and output signals are 
similar, they would require a degree of normalisation for the 
technique to work in an over the air environment. 
Normalisation would require alignment, attenuation or 
amplification, comparison and correction. Initial attempts to 
manually achieve this using the graphical tools in Sonic 
Visualiser and Audacity were not successful. Using 
techniques such as perceptual hashing, bit error rate mapping 
and dynamic warping distance (using the empirical data to 
drive structured research) may deliver a solution and is 
planned for later research. 
Also, to assess detectability of the hidden signal, spectrogram 
plots were also made. The plots were made using sonic 
visualiser. Spectrograms are a visual representation of the 
spectrum of frequencies present in the sound sample as it 
varies over time. The purpose of plotting the spectrograms 
were to compare the input sound files with the output sound 
files (with hidden text) to see if there are visibly any 
difference between the two. It was anticipated that as the 
method of encoding was based upon modifying the amplitude 
of parts of the sound rather than changing the sound itself, 
that no visible difference would be visible between input and 
output frequencies present in the digital domain tests.   With 
the over the air environment tests, it was envisaged that some 
very minor differences would be present due to noise 
however this would be minimal due to the carefully 
controlled environment of the lab test. 
 
 
Figure VI-5 Comparison of Input and Output Voice Spectrogram 
with Sensitivity Variable 1000 
For all the samples observed, there were no significant 
differences between the input and output file spectrograms 
with the exception of where the sensitivity variable was set 
lower than 1000. As observed in the time domain, the “spike” 
seen at the most aggressive sensitivity is as follows:  
Voice Sample Tests
Sensitivity 
Variable
Decoded 
OK?
Decoded Output Visual 
Interference?
Audio
Interference?
100 Y this is a hidden message H Y
1000 Y this is a hidden message M Y
5000 Y this is a hidden message M N
10000 Y this is a hidden message L N
50000 N thhrhr`hhccenlerr`fe L N
75000 N rggr gr ` ggbben-lerr`ge L N
100000 N thhq"hq"_"hhbben"keqq_ee L N
500000 N zkkz.kz.k.kkkkkz.zkzzkkk L N
 
Figure VI-6 Comparison of Input and Output Sample (100 
Sensitivity) 
VII. SUMMARY EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
This lab test generated useful insight into the future direction 
of the research and in particular the feasibility of this 
steganography technique in a sound PKI technique. More 
testing is required to establish the practical soundness of the 
overall method. The technique as developed so far puts the 
hidden information in the first few milliseconds of a sample. 
It also has the benefit of not increasing the size of the overall 
sound file and if tuned correctly has no impact that can be 
detected by the human auditory system (an essential quality 
for audio steganography). It is also simple to implement in its 
current form and works effectively in the digital domain 
providing the sensitivity is set correctly. This in itself is a 
useful finding in its own right. The technique however 
requires further development if it is to be successful in “over 
the air” applications. If the sound is to be transmitted “over 
the air” as an audio signal, the lab test showed that the 
technique does not yet work without additional processing 
which will inform the next steps of the research. 
The findings from this lab test will also be useful in the scope 
and development of a conceptual framework of how this 
technique might be used in a wider context. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
Devices that use voice authentication and voice user 
interfaces continue to grow in acceptance and use. With more 
smart home devices, cars, voice assistants, smart phones and 
IOT devices using audio channels for input, the importance 
of the security and performance of such systems will continue 
to grow. In this research a new conceptual model for 
authenticating users has been proposed that uses audio 
steganography to transmit key material. A path for future 
research has been outlined as well as establishing a new 
digital steganography technique. By testing both digital and 
analogue (over air) transmission methods, the analogue 
aspects have proved more of a challenge. Future experimental 
work to be undertaken will include decoding the “over the 
air” signals using techniques such as perceptual hashing, bit 
error rate mapping and dynamic warping distance for feature 
extraction. The focus of the research will continue to be 
concentrated on finalising the conceptual model utilising 
empirical and experimental data collected in the next phase 
of the research. It has been possible using the literature 
review, analysis and experimentation to begin the creation of 
a conceptual model – a PKI for Sound.  
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